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Abstract
This paper explores the attempts of Japan to provoke Mongol nationalism in her favor between the years 1918-1939 by
influencing the practice of Buddhism in Mongol territories. For centuries Buddhism was an integral part of Mongol
culture, and with the shift in the political situation of the Mongols in the early 20th century it was Buddhism that
Mongol nationalism rallied around. The Japanese keenly recognized this and attempted to further use Buddhism as a
unifying force to build a “Great Mongol State”, in hopes of bringing together all Mongol ethnic groups under Japan’s
control. This Japanese policy undertaken in the early 20th century towards the Mongols was based on intensive
academic and intelligence studies of Mongol local culture and religion in different territories. Japan’s already existing
knowledge and practice of the Buddhist religion provided a firm foundation for their attempted manipulation of the
Mongol brand of Buddhism that further fortified Mongol nationalism. The initial attempt by the Japanese to promote
Buddhism for political ends was in Buryat Mongolia in the early 1920s. They then followed this initiative with a
greater push in spreading their religious propaganda among the Eastern and Inner Mongols in the 1930s. However,
despite their knowledge of the Buddhist religion, their attempt to manipulate Mongolian Buddhism for the end goal of
promoting Mongol nationalism eventually failed.
Keywords: Buddhism, Buryat Mongols, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Japan expansionism, Mongol nationalism, Soviet
Union
Introduction
Historically, Mongolian Buddhism in the territories of Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Buryat (Buryat
Autonomous Region in Russia), and Oirat (Western) Mongolia played a significant role in Mongolian nationalism in
the first half of the twentieth century. “Mongolia Proper”, otherwise explained as the core territory in which Mongol
ethnic people inhabited starts in the west from the eastern shores of Lake Balkash in modern day Kazakhstan to the
east as far as the modern city of Harbin in Manchuria; and in the south from the Great Wall and just north of the city of
Urumqi to the north until Lake Baikal in Siberia. Modern political/geographical boundaries of the region were not
finalized into the borders we recognize today until 1950 when the jointly signed treaty between the Soviet Union and
Communist China guaranteed the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic and finalized its state borders;
this treaty effectively separated the various Mongol tribes into inhabiting Soviet, Chinese, and Mongol territories today
as it solidified the borders where each of these three countries intersected.
Mongol nationalism, although present throughout Mongol society, was not an interest of vital concern to the
various Mongol tribes. However, in the late 17th century, Tsarist Russian policy for expansion reached the Buryat
Mongols and eventually brought them under Russian control, and by the 18th century the Buryat Mongol territory was
already an inseparable part of Tsarist Russia. Historically the Buryat Mongols have lived around the lake Baikal for
centuries and are considered as one of the largest ethnic Mongol groups. Moreover, in the late Qing period Chinese
peasants and merchants began settling in Mongol territory in large numbers and this settlement boomed after the fall of
the Qing Empire.
Therefore, in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, the Mongols began experiencing rapidly growing pressure
from Russian and Chinese political and territorial interests which continued their expansion into Mongol territories,
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thereby threatening their national and cultural interests. Growing foreign economic and political pressure resulted in
the development of a nationalist movement among the Mongols. Generally, the same Mongol race, language, history
and way of nomadic life largely defined Mongol nationalism throughout its history. However, given the tribal
differences among the Mongol ethnics at the time, the Buddhist religion became the most effective unifying factor of
Mongol nationalism in the early 20th century following the fall of the Qing Empire and its withdrawal from Mongol
lands in 1911. This unification of Mongol identity centered on Buddhism was epitomized by the enthronement of the
Bogd Javzandamba Khutukhtu as the Khan (King) of Khalkha Mongolia. Khalkha is the largest ethnic group of the
Mongols, who lived in the area roughly encompassing the current Mongolian state. The region of Mongolian territory
inhabited by Khalkha Mongols is often termed “Outer Mongolia”. Although it has been argued that Buddhism was the
only available ideology to counter the rising socialist ideology in the region, this act by the Khalkha Mongols to
bestow supreme power to their religious figurehead in 1911 might have encouraged the Japanese to use Buddhism in
order to unify different Mongol ethnics two decades later in the 1930’s.
Knowing the importance of Buddhism in the daily life of the Mongols, its two neighbors pursued mostly friendly
policies towards the Mongol religion. By encouraging Buddhism, the Manchu Empire and Tsarist Russia had
attempted to strengthen their influence among the Mongols and manipulate the religion for their interests since the 16th
and the 17th centuries, respectively. The Mongols, Manchu, and Russians continued to be the only active players in the
region until the early 20th century. With the expansion of Japan in continental Northeast Asia in the early 1930’s, the
active players in the region increased by one. It was at this time that given the political, economic, and social
connections between the area of Manchuria and Mongolia Proper, Japan emerged as a fourth player in the region and
decided to take part in the political and cultural/religious affairs of the Mongols. When Japan occupied Manchuria, a
part of which was Eastern Mongolia Proper historically, Japan pursued a policy seeking to gain the support of the local
people and to use Mongol nationalist ideology in their favor. The Japanese broached an appeal to the Mongols, which
intended to win over all Mongol ethnic groups starting from east to west for the end goal of exercising Japanese
influence over all Mongol ethnic people in Inner Asia.
In the first part of this paper, a brief review of historical data provides a general picture of Mongolia’s external
political environment and an understanding of why a Mongol nationalist movement was developed and what led the
Mongols to such reactionary moves against her neighbors’ policies. The second part of the paper explores the early
period of Japan’s involvement in the Mongol nationalist movement through Buddhism in Buryat Mongol territory in
the Lake Baikal region of Siberia. The third and final part of the paper, followed by the conclusion, examines Japan’s
second attempt to promote Mongol nationalism by reviving and reforming Buddhism, in the name of establishing a
“Great Mongol State” among the Mongols in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in the 1930s.
Methodology
This paper provides a historical account of some of Japan’s motives and actions in dealing with the Mongols in the
time period of 1918-1939. It was noted from the beginning that there was very little in the English and Mongolian
literature on the subject. The information presented in this paper has been collected from the analytical narratives of
foreign observers and with the use of secondary sources. Supported by Topolski (1976), the gathering of data, its
synthesis and analysis were based on source-based knowledge, and source-based information/data, including secondary
historical sources; all have been qualitatively analyzed.
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It has been the author’s job to sift through and interpret the validity and relevance of secondary sources to
complete this paper. Given that the primary data concerning this historical account is deficient in both the Mongolian
and English languages, secondary sources were relied on to provide the context and complete this historical
study. Given that access to primary data concerning this historical account in both Mongolian and English language
sources has been limited and deficient, secondary sources were relied on to provide context and fill certain holes in
order to complete this historical study. It is hoped that a historical scholarship using secondary sources could pull
together a new perspective, the significance of which was to contribute to the study of Japan’s involvement in
promoting Mongolian nationalism through Buddhism.
Discussion
1 – Historical Background
Historically the Russians arrived in the Baikal Lake area in the 17th century. In 1691, the Khalkha Mongol princes of
Outer Mongolia who were defeated by the Oirat Mongols (Western Mongols) turned south for help and submitted
suzerainty to the Manchu (Qing) Empire. Western Oirat Mongols consist of several smaller ethnic groups who inhabit
the western part of Mongolia Proper. The Buryats were a part of the Mongol Empire since the 13th century; however,
as Russians’ eastward advances intensified in the late 17th century, the Buryats had no choice but to sign a treaty with
the Russians and become subjects of Tsarist Russia in 1689.
As political conditions drastically changed in the early 20th century, Mongol nationalism was first developed on a
large scale. The Tsarist and Manchu authorities reversed their policies towards the Mongols and implemented a more
progressive and intrusive administrative policy over the Mongol territories in Buryat, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria.
More Russians moving west aggressively pushed the Buryats out of their land. In 1902, Tsarist regulations directly
attacked the social structure of the Buryats.
Similarly, in the late 19th century, the Manchu officials, afraid of Russia’s further expansion into Mongol
territory, reversed their previous policy of protecting the Mongols from the Chinese. Instead, the settlement of Chinese
farmers accelerated in Eastern and Inner Mongolian territories. This rapid and extensive penetration into Mongol
territory aimed at absorbing Mongol lands and people under the Chinese rule. The Mongols of Inner, Eastern
(Manchurian), and Buryat Mongolia experienced a direct threat from the Chinese and Russian economic and political
advancements, as well as their cultural expansion. There was no doubt that this rapid ‘Sinification’ and ‘Russification’
would soon lead to a shift in the Mongols political position, as well as a shift in their culture. But the Khalkhas of
Outer Mongolia were in a relatively better position by being distant from foreign disturbances as compared to other
Mongol ethnic groups at the time.
The outcomes of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 enabled the
Imperial Japan not only to occupy considerable territories in Continental Northeast Asia, but it also gained a worldwide
prestige for its political and military strength. The Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1915 gave Japan certain privileges in
Eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. The Japanese sought to strategically and economically use Manchuria by
taking control of the existing transportation systems and building of new railroads, as well as exploiting its natural
resources. Thus, Japan aggressively pushed its military advancement towards East Asia competing with the strategic
interests of both Russia and China.
In 1918, a year after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Japan sent its military to Siberia (Russian Far East) and
temporarily occupied the important Maritime Province of Vladivostok and some Buryat territory of Russian Siberia.
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Meanwhile, far-eastern Russia was temporarily under Admiral Kolchak’s control, who was assisted by Britain, the
USA, France, Italy, and Japan as well. These Western powers and Japan according to the 1918 Britain conference
decided to send seven thousand troops from each country to Russia’s Far East in order to oppose the new revolutionary
government; Japan sent ten times as many (Phillips, 1942, p. 26). As the Japanese troops occupied Vladivostok and
further advanced along the Trans Siberian Railway reaching as far as Lake Baikal in 1918, they established relations
with Ataman Semyonov, not Kolchak, but his more important officer. Japan’s policy of supporting the unification of
the Mongols under the Narmai Mongol state under Semyonov and Baron Ungern leadership in the early 1920s, and its
later attempt to build the Manchukuo state with the active participation of the Mongols in the 1930s show that Japan
had an early political interest in Mongol affairs as she advanced farther west into the Northeast Asian continent. Now
there was an opportunity for Japan to further pursue its expansion policy towards the nations of East Asia. This was the
first time that the Buryat Mongols were recognized by foreigners as the gateway/middle-men to other Mongol groups
and their territories.
2 – The First Period of Japan’s Policy Towards Mongol Nationalism
Mongolia’s immediate neighbors, Tsarist Russia (later the Soviet Union), the Manchu (Qing) Empire of China, and the
Imperial Japan as a rather distant neighbor, were all aware of the importance of Mongol Buddhism in dealing with the
Mongols. Mongolia was geographically isolated from direct communication with all nations except Russia and China
and sought new allies. In 1914, the 8th Jebtsun Damba, the political and spiritual leader of all Mongols, sent a letter to
the Emperor of Japan requesting assistance in the struggle for Mongol unification. He was known as the eighth
reincarnation of the first Buddhist spiritual leader of the Mongols, was a Tibetan, and was enthroned as the Khaan of
all Mongols as a result of the 1911 national revolution for independence from the Qing Dynasty. This was a critical
time for the survival of Mongolia’s independence, as they had freed themselves from the Manchus three years earlier.
The Japanese Government silently rejected this request. This was the first direct attempt of the Mongols to establish
direct contact with the Imperial Japan in the 20th century (Cheney, 1968, p. 44).
Ten years before this in 1904, a significant event took place in Urga, which led the Mongols to seriously consider
Mongol independence from the Qing Empire. The 13th Dalai Lama of Tibet (Ngag-dbang Blo-gzang Thub-ldan) fled to
Urguu (the capital of Outer Mongolia) because of the British occupation of Lhasa in 1904. The 13th Dalai Lama’s visit
to Outer Mongolia in 1904 had strategic significance in seeking for political support from the Mongols, as both the
Mongols and the Tibetans were now free following the collapse of the Qing Empire. However, this visit by the Dalai
Lama could undermine the political and religious authority of the 8th Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu, the spiritual and
political leader of the Mongols whom would later be enthroned as the Khan of the Khalkha Mongols after the 1911
national movement for independence. The Jebtsun Damba recognized the Dalai Lama’s religious primacy, but resisted
any challenge from the Dalai Lama to his political authority. Wherever the Dalai Lama went, Buryat, Khalkha, Oirat,
Inner, and Eastern Mongols followed him, showed great respect, and paid tribute to him as a Living Buddha. The
Dalai Lama’s presence in Mongol territories had no direct political influence over the Mongols since the Mongols in
history never looked to Lhasa for political leadership; however, thousands of Mongol Buddhists gathered wherever the
Dalai Lama was, strongly proving that the Mongols had a very strong Buddhist religious tie among themselves.
This was also the time that thousands of Mongols, from different parts of Mongol territory gathered together and
had a chance to chat about their political and economic conditions under the Qing Dynasty, which by this time was
already weakening throughout Mongol territory. At the same time, this provoked the Mongol awareness of Chinese
and Russian incursions into their lands. Such large gatherings became a conditional cause for the Mongols to express
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their nationalistic sentiments. At that time China and Russia were paying close attention to the Dalai Lama’s political
refuge in Mongolia. More importantly, the Dalai Lama’s great religious influence on the Mongols must have had some
effect on the policy of its neighbors towards Mongolia and its Buddhism. This perhaps helped foreign powers to realize
the significance of using Buddhism towards the Mongols in advancing their interest among the Mongol people and
throughout their territories.
Historically, Buddhism came to Buryat via Outer Mongolia and Tibet in the 17th century. Since then the Buryats
have had a strong religious connection with both Urga and Lhasa. As Russian pressures strengthened and their interests
expanded, some Buryat intellectual lamas attempted to create a Buddhist-oriented kingdom, highlighting their religious
and cultural unity. One of these intellectuals was Agvan Dorjeev, who envisioned a Mongol-Tibet Buddhist state
headed by the Dalai Lama (Rupen, 1964, p. 106). The idea was to create a strong Buddhist state in Central and East
Asia. Agvan Dorjeev’s Pan-Buddhism idea was an extension of Pan-Mongolism, but added Tibet to the Mongol areas
and would bring the two nations under religious unification.
The idea of Pan-Buddhism was later promoted by the Japanese when they sent over seventy thousand troops to
assist Admiral Kolchak in his counter-revolutionary campaign against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. According to Rupen,
the two leading Buryat Buddhist leaders, Agvan Dorjeev and Tserenpil supported Kolchak. Agvan Dorjeev was paid
twenty thousand rubles monthly by the Kolchak regime to oppose socialist and revolutionary movements among the
Buryats (Ibid., p. 135). Since the Kolchak regime was funded by the Japanese, Khambo Lama Agvan Dorjeev’s
activities were also indirectly financed by the Japanese; such moves were aimed at winning over the Buryat Mongols
and separating them from Russia by including them into the greater Pan-Mongolism initiative based on Buddhist and
nomadic culture. This was the first time the Japanese attempted to expand the propaganda of “Asia for the Asiatics”
involving the local Buryat Mongols.
According to Phillips, all Japanese agents were Buddhist monks, perhaps disguised as Mongol lamas. Phillips
states, “Japanese agents, often Buddhist lama priests, went around the tribes preaching that Japan was heaven and the
Japanese troops were divine avengers of earthly injustice and wickedness…” (Phillips, 1942, p. 27). This strong
statement was justified by a mysterious Buddhist prophecy of the Army of Shambala (Mon: Shambal; Tib: Tyan-
p’yogs kyi Sam-bha-la). The original idea of Shambala is that the Great King Eregden Dagbo, who resided in his
Buddha-land Shambala, which existed in the far northern space, would someday descend to earth to destroy evil and
promote the Dharma or the teachings of the Buddha. Interestingly, this mysterious prophecy was then re-interpreted by
the Japanese that heaven Shambala was located in the east, in the land of Japan, and the Japanese troops as the Army
of Shambala came to defeat “heretics and atheists”, meaning Bolsheviks, and to restore order. Eventually all the
“evils” would be destroyed by the troops of the Rising Sun and all Buddhists would be empowered (Ibid., p. 69).
But the Buryats favored Semyonov more than they did the Japanese due to Russian cultural and political
familiarity that had developed for over two centuries. A year later, the Japanese put efforts in creating a “Pan-Mongol
movement”, which was to re-establish a “Great Mongol” Empire or “Mongol Proper”. It seems that at this time the
Japanese were more interested in Pan-Mongolia rather than Pan-Buddhism. It was obvious that Japan’s policy was to
promote nationalism amongst the Mongols through manipulating Buddhism but not to create a Buddhist state. In this
matter Semyonov took the lead in gathering a group of Inner Mongols and Buryats in Chita, Siberia. Six
representatives from Buryat Mongolia, five from Inner Mongolia, and four from Eastern Mongolia (extending into
Manchuria), joined the meeting. Semyonov and the Japanese Major Sutsui, an adviser for Semyonov, actively took part
in the conference. None from Outer Mongolia attended the meeting. Due mainly to both foreign pressure and domestic
reluctance, Outer Mongolia did not send any representative to this gathering.
44
Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies Volume 31, 2012
The conference laid down the first constitution of the Pan-Mongolian State Government and decided with a
single voice that Japan, due to its strong Buddhist tradition and military strength, would be the best foreign protector of
the newly established state. Semyonov promised to supply one million rubles for the new government and weapons for
the new Mongolian army. Because of the costly civil war with the Red Army, Semyonov himself could not produce the
money and weapons he had promised. Without Japanese support Semyonov was unable to fulfill his promises. The
hesitation by Japan to continue its support of Semyonov was primarily due to its own economic difficulties, more
importantly its lack of arms supply in Manchuria. This, coupled with the external pressure by the Chinese, led to
Japan’s decision not to continue its support of Semyonov, and consequently the Pan-Mongolia plan failed. This new
government’s enduring attempt to appeal to the Jebtsun Damba for political and religious leadership of a newly unified
Mongol nation-state resulted in vain.
From the beginning of the establishment of a Pan-Mongolian State, the Jebtsun Damba of Urguu was suspicious
of Semyonov and some Buryat leaders. On one hand, it was very clear to the Outer Mongolian leadership that this new
government would not last long without direct involvement of Outer Mongolia. On the other hand it was a very
complicated political situation since the new government was supported only by Japan and a makeshift conglomerate
of former Tsarist (White) Russians, while both the Bolshevik Russians and the Chinese warlords adamantly opposed
this initiative. Obviously, the Chinese strongly pressured the Jebtsun Damba not to join the government.
Throughout Western Buryat territory, the Japanese agents were admitted to travel without hindrance. Even after
the establishment of the Buryat Republic under Soviet rule, the Japanese were still influential in terms of money and
ideology. As Buryats were known during this time to play to each side of the Red vs. White Russian revolution and
counter-revolution, their allegiances were often shaky and opportunistic. In accordance with the Phillips’ account,
many important officials of the Government of the Buryat-Mongol Soviet Republic were in fact Japanese agents,
including the Bolshevik Party Secretary Yerbanov and some members of the People’s Commissars. Phillips further
says:
“Throughout western Buryat-Mongolia, where the Buddhist church was still strong, Japan spread her
propaganda by means of lama monks. The propaganda was of two kinds: one for the dispossessed
upper layers of the old regime, and one for the still superstitious elements of the Buryat peasantry”
(Ibid., p. 68).
From this quote we could see that Japan’s policy was to attract and favor the high class of monks and noble families
suppressed by the Russians, and then provide hope for ordinary people that the creation of a new state would bring
about prosperity in their traditional religion, Buddhism.
Since the Jebtsun Damba did not support the new Pan-Mongolian regime, the most important person of the new
government was Neisse Gegen, a reincarnated lama of Inner Mongolia, who headed the government for a short period
of time, and one of the most influential Inner Mongolian Buddhist reincarnated lamas of the time. Neisse Gegen sent a
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference aiming at gaining international recognition for the new regime (Rupen, 1964,
p. 135). The Pan-Mongol Government was not successful in gaining international recognition, and of even greater
frustration to the Pan-Mongol Government, they could not even secure support from their brothers the Khalkha
Mongols of Outer Mongolia. Such failures resulted in the withdrawal of Japanese support. This time the Gegen himself
tried to re-establish contact with the Japanese but did not succeed. The Pan-Mongol Government collapsed and soon
after the Gegen was captured and executed by the Chinese.
However, this was not the end, and in 1920 the Japanese tried again. The Japanese financially assisted and armed
Baron von Ungern-Sternberg, a high-ranking officer of Semyonov, and sent him to Urguu, where he claimed to restore
45
Japan’s involvement in the promotion of Mongol nationalism through Buddhism 1918-1939
a Great Mongol State with the Japanese assistance. The Baron placed the Jebtsun Damba under house-arrest and forced
him to admit his puppet government named “Ikh Mongol” (Great Mongol). Simultaneous to Japan’s reinvigorated
plans to create a Pan-Mongol state, the Chinese warlord Xu Shuzheng took control of Urguu and dismantled the
Jebtsun Damba government. Interestingly the Mongols, from the Jebtsun Damba himself to ordinary people, much
favored the Baron since he was the key figure who freed Outer Mongolia from Chinese colonization. For his victory
over the Chinese, the Jebtsun Damba awarded the Baron with the title of a Buddhist reincarnation.
Ungern-Sternberg’s order to his officers proves that he was under Ataman Semyonov’s guidance and they both
were receiving assistance from the Japanese (Phillips, 1942, p. 35). However, the Baron’s government quickly
alienated the Mongols and it soon imploded. The primary reason for the failure of Baron’s regime was the economic
exploitation of first the Russian expatriate community in Urguu in which all expatriate wealth was confiscated by the
Baron, and second, the even more ill-advised economic exploitation of the Mongols themselves; as such the Mongol
sentiment for the Baron spiraled quickly downward soon after his rise to power. Soon, mainly due to the lack of
Mongol support, Unger-Sternberg’s troops were hopelessly defeated by the Soviet Red Army, and in 1922, he was
captured by the Soviet militia and executed in the Western Mongol region. This put an end to Japan’s continuing
efforts in creating a Pan-Mongolian state in Buryat and Outer Mongolia; but yet again, this was not Japan’s last try.
3 – The Second Period of Japan’s Policy for Mongol Nationalism and Buddhism
In 1931, the Japanese invaded the three eastern provinces of Northeastern China and declared them independent from
China under the name of Manchukuo. The size and strategic position of the territory populated by Mongols in
Manchuria gave the Mongols a greater advantage over other ethnic groups in the region when dealing with the
Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese also annexed a former Inner Mongolian province and further advanced into the
western part of Inner Mongolia. Without an active Mongol policy, Japan could not complete its continental expansion
in Inner Asia. The Japanese chose Mongol Buddhism again to be their most favored tool to win Mongol support. In the
long-run, this Japanese policy was intended to attract the Khalkha Mongols via the Inner and Eastern Mongols whilst
further distancing them from Soviet influence. The policy and its implementation of Pan-Mongolism became
increasingly aggressive in Inner Mongolia in the 1930s. The Japanese manipulated the Inner Mongolian nationalist
movement and exploited the Khalkha refugees (who had escaped from Mongolian communist rule), and tried to sever
Outer Mongolia from the Soviet’s ideological and economic influence.
The Inner Mongolian nationalist movement was divided into the Ulanfu group supported by Chinese
Communists and Pa’I Yun-t’I group who cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek. One of the leaders of the group supporting
the Kuomintang was Prince Demchugdongrob, also known as Te Wang. Prince Te was claimed to be the last Prince of
the Altan Urag, the Golden Clan of Chinggis Khan. He was born in the Sunid Right Banner of Inner Mongolia. In the
beginning of Japan’s expansion into Inner Mongolia, Prince Te was the first person with whom the Japanese contacted.
Sasame Tsueno who was also a Japanese Buddhist monk, brought a letter from General Matsui Iwane and General
Hayashi Senjuro to Prince Te. The letter, according to Jagchid (1999), explained Japan’s desire to help the Mongols
gain their independence with the assistance of Japan (p. 58).
Japanese activities among the Inner and Manchurian Mongols were carried out by the Japanese Special Service
Officers and the Good Neighbor Association (Zenrin Kyokai). It was Sasame Tsuneo’s idea to create the Association,
which was formally established in 1933 with the support of General Hayashi Senjuro and Mazumoro Koryo (Ibid., p.
127). Besides conducting intelligence work, the Association administered other educational and cultural (religious)
programs. The Association had more than one branch in various banners of Inner Mongolia. The Good Neighbor
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Association in cooperation with local administrative offices sent a number of Mongolian students, including some
monks, to Japan to study. Even Te Wang sent his eldest son to Tokyo to receive education in 1939.
During the early period of the occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese forced young lamas to serve in its military
in Manchuria. They soon realized that this was an ill-advised move, as any anti-Buddhist activity would work against
their policy and drive the Mongols away from the Japanese. The Mongols of Manchuria were just as important in this
situation as the Mongols of Inner Mongolia in terms of their role in Japan’s further expansion into Continental
North/Inner Asia. If at any time they felt disaffected by Japanese policy, they could easily turn either to Outer
Mongolia or to China and pose a perpetual threat to the increasing strategic interest of Japan’s expansion and territorial
control in the region. Therefore, the Japanese prohibited the Chinese immigration into Mongol territory and worked
towards strengthening Mongol support by treating its religion in a more “special” way. Thus, when Japan invaded
Inner Mongolia, it implemented a more friendly policy towards the lamas and monasteries. Because of the political
influences of monasteries in Mongol areas, the Japanese pursued a policy to “Japanize” Mongol Buddhism.
According to Gubler, the Pan-Buddhist movement in continental Asia was legitimized by the establishment of
the “Buddhist Association of Japan and Mongolia” (Nichi Mo Bukkyokai) in Tokyo in 1938. This association was later
reorganized as a more inclusive organization named “The Buddhist Association of Asia under Japanese Leadership”
(Gubler, 1968, p. 28). Another association that carried out significant scholarly works on the study of Mongolian
culture and religion was the “Association for a Good Neighborhood” (Zenrin Kyokai). Besides various government
funded associations, some religious sects also took a crucial part in research and study projects. On this Jagchid (1999)
provides a clear account stating:
“This Japanification policy was run by the Koyazan sect, with roots in the Japanese Shinganshu sect.
Koyazan was a tantric Buddhist sect that had many similarities to the esoteric Buddhism of Tibet; it
dispatched many monks to visit Mongolian monasteries and conduct research into Mongolian religious
beliefs and practices” (p. 271).
Another Japanese Buddhist sect that carried out the religious policy of Mongol Buddhist reform was Omoto-kyo,
which was established during the Meiji period, headed by a Buddhist priest and intelligence agent named Ideguchi.
Ideguchi, according to Katsumi, was the leader of the group and had a missionary plan to spread the teachings of the
Omoto-kyo sect among the Mongols. Another individual who undertook the role of a religious missionary was Higashi
Honganji, a Japanese priest of esoteric Buddhism. While studying Buddhism in Mongolia, Honganji became a lama of
Mongolian Buddhism.
Similarly, Gubler (1968) also mentions that a number of Japanese Buddhist priests lived in Mongol monasteries,
learned the Mongolian language, and dressed as Mongol lamas. Katsumi (1999) also supports this fact, reinforcing that
it was true that some Japanese Buddhist monks temporarily lived in Mongol monasteries and acted as if they were
Mongol lamas. These Japanese monks conducted surveys of Buddhist temples and monasteries and their activities.
Obviously, their “missionary” work resulted more in scholarly works and intelligence information gathering than
religious conversion.
Japan’s Buddhist propaganda was carried out on the basis of a careful study of Mongol culture and religion,
which led to the forcing of the local people to adopt some aspects of Japanese culture. In this case it was obvious that
Japanese Buddhism was the tool that worked to influence Mongol religion and culture. These extensive research works
were generously funded by the Japanese government, specifically by the Ministry of Education, in the early period of
Japan’s expansion. In later years during the war, these types of research projects were funded by such organizations as
the Manchuria Ethnology Association organized in 1941 and the Northwest Institute established in 1943; both
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organizations were located in Manchuria. According to Katsumi (1999), many researchers dispatched by the
Ethnological Institute, which was funded by the Japanese Navy and Army, came to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to
conduct a number of research projects. Although we mainly discuss Japan’s policy to attempt a reform of Mongol
Buddhism in the pre-war era, it appears that even during the war this process of using Mongol Buddhism for
information gathering by the Japanese continued, which implies that this policy was both deliberate and organized
throughout its lifespan.
It was difficult for the Japanese to impose their new religious reform policy on the higher ranking and more
influential lamas, who were reluctant to accept Japan’s propaganda in promoting Japanese Buddhism as a superior sect
of the Buddhist faith. Thus, the Japanese decided instead to recruit young lamas in their twenties and send them to
Japan for religious education and training. These young lamas were sent to Shingon University at Mt. Koya, where
they studied various religious subjects of Shingon Buddhism. This school for young lamas was called Koa Mikkyo
Gakuin. The curriculum included instruction in everything from an elementary Japanese language program to
complicated religious content and training, which was to be completed within three years (Gubler, 1968, p. 47). These
young lamas were then expected to return to Mongolia and reform Mongol Buddhism.
Due to their limited ability (mainly due to language and cultural differences) to teach Mongolians in Japan at the
time, the number of Mongol students sent to Japan for Buddhist training was relatively small. The local government
services in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria recruited those who qualified. As an example, only thirty young lamas from
Manchuria were enrolled in the program in 1934 (Ibid., p. 49). The majority of these students returned earlier than
expected. For various reasons, the dropout rate among the Mongol students was roughly thirty percent. Those who
remained for two or three years completed the program, with a few continuing their studies conducting research in
Japan after completing the three-year program. However, the outcomes of the religious reform policy of the Mongols
did not live up to the expectations of the Japanese. As Jagchid (1999) mentions, most of the lamas who went to Japan
did not change their religious beliefs; the number of students was insignificant and the length of the program was not
sufficient enough to convince these young lamas to change their religious values and day-to-day practices. The cultural
and linguistic difficulties while in Japan, coupled with the lack of an incentive to reform their own understanding of
Buddhism led to the failure of this religious “study abroad” program.
Both Mongol Buddhism and Shingon sectarian Buddhism share some similar teachings and practices based on
various esoteric elements. Despite these similarities, the Japanese priests faced difficult resistance from the leaders of
local Buddhist monastic institutions who did not desire any type of reform to the traditional way of their religious life.
As the Japanese tried to push their religious reform policy harder, they faced more conservative and reactionary
attitudes from the higher Mongol lamas, who favored the protective side of Japan’s reform policy, rather than the
“purification” elements of it.
In May 1943, the “Second Conference for the Restoration of Mongolian Buddhism” took place in Kalgan
(today’s Hohot, the capital city of Inner Mongolia). The First Conference had taken place a year earlier and proved less
significant and unproductive. Local officials, high-ranking lamas, and chief Japanese advisors attended the second
conference; their main objective was to avoid Japanese intervention in religious affairs and to emphasize the
importance of the traditional religious system. A goal of the conference was to establish the Secretariat Office of
Lamas’ Affairs (Lama-yin Tamgyn Gazar) to regulate and manage religious affairs. The Office consisted of several of
the most influential Mongol reincarnations and high lamas. Interestingly, a Japanese military officer, named Yukei
Kogan, was appointed to the position of advisor to the Secretariat Office. Yukei Kogan was the head of the local
intelligence bureau and a Buddhist monk (Jagchid, 1999, p. 297). The conference resulted in a symbolic outcome
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rather than a practical one given that the influential Mongol lamas wanted to keep running their religious affairs in an
independent and traditional way without compromising their spiritual authority.
In the process of “Japanification” of Mongol Buddhism, various Buddhist sects both Japanese and Mongol (to a
lesser degree) carried out extensive education and training programs for the purpose of ‘cultural unification” with the
end goal of strengthening Japan’s new order in East Asia. In the summer of 1940, along with the Buddhist reforms, the
Japanese extended Shintoism to the newly occupied territories, one of which was Changchun, the capital of
Manchukuo where the spirit of Amaterasu Omikami was transferred, and a new Shinto shrine was erected to symbolize
Japan’s control over Manchukuo (Holtom, 1947, p. 169). The principal of bringing in other races as subjects of Japan,
along with compassion for Buddhism, was incorporated into Japan’s expansionism policy. Therefore, Japan’s religious
policy towards the Mongols was well prepared as different religious sects were actively involved.
After 1937, the Japanese further advanced in Inner Mongolia spreading propaganda about a “renaissance of
Buddhism”, which was an attempt to reorganize Buddhist monasteries. This propaganda, also included a declaration of
a “Holy War” against Communism (Rupen, p. 227). This Japanese policy was supported by the wishes of the most
influential lamas, and was purely initiated for the purpose of changing the structure of monastic institutions and their
monks’ way of life. For example, Japanese monks worked to persuade Mongol lamas to engage in farming. To the
livestock handling Mongols this was surprisingly unusual and contradictory to their spiritual teaching and daily life
rituals and practices.
Historically, the most interesting and significant project the Japanese aimed at implementing was finding the next
reincarnation of the 8th Jebtsun Damba, the spiritual leader of all Mongols. Regarding this matter a more in depth
study is required to further provide a detailed account of Japan’s direct involvement in selecting the next reincarnate of
Mongolia’s highest religious leader in that period. If this project worked out, the Japanese could have greatly benefited
in convincing the Mongols that they had the legitimacy to influence Mongol Buddhism. The Japanese sought the
support of the 13th Dalai Lama to persuade Mongol lamas and lay Buddhists of their intentions:
“In the worst class is the manner of working among the Red [Communist] people. They do not allow
search to be made for the new Incarnation of the Grand Lama of Urga. They have seized and taken away
all the sacred objects from the monasteries. They have made monks to work as soldiers. They have
broken religion, so that not even the name of it remains” (Ibid., p. 228).
This type of influential statement of Mongol and Tibetan religious leaders became the core-guiding principal for the
Japanese in their search of the 9th Jebtsun Damba in Tibet. However, the death of the 8th Jebtsun Damba in 1924
removed all obstacles for the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP – Communist Party of the People’s Republic of
Mongolia) and further strengthened the socialist regime in Outer Mongolia. This was the end of the strong political,
economic, and religious position of Mongol Buddhism in Outer Mongolia. In the same year, the Outer Mongolian
MPP Government officially announced that there would be no further reincarnation of the Jebtsun Damba in Mongolia.
All Mongols since the 16th century looked towards Urguu, the capital city of Outer Mongolia as called before 1924,
and specifically the Jebtsun Damba for spiritual and political leadership (the revolutionary government changed the
name of the capital city of Mongolia to Ulaanbaatar, literally meaning Red Hero, in 1924). Therefore, given the
unification powers of Mongol Buddhism among the scattered Mongol tribes, the 9th Jebtsun Damba reincarnate would
be the only political figure with the ability to pull all Mongols towards unification. Therefore, finding the ninth
reincarnation would give the Japanese enormous political and religious influence over the Mongols. Consequently, a
group of high lamas and Japanese advisors were sent to Lhasa, Tibet in order to find a new reincarnation. The highest
lama among the delegates was the Dilowa Khutukhtu, who was one of the most influential reincarnate lamas of Outer
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Mongolia (he escaped the Communist oppression of Buddhism in Mongolia in the 1930s and defected to Inner
Mongolia after nearly being executed by the communist authorities in Outer Mongolia). The 13th Dalai Lama offered
his spiritual guidance to the joint Japanese and Mongol Buddhist plan of finding the 9th reincarnate of the Jebtsun
Damba. Jagchid (1999) explains that the Japanese arranged and financed the entire 1935 trip to Lhasa and its grander
plan of implementation (p. 271). However, probably due to the strong opposition from the Outer Mongolian
government, and opposition by the Chinese and some Inner Mongolian nationalist leaders, such as Te Wang, the search
plan for the 9th Jebtsun Damba was not completed. Perhaps as a result of this search, the Tibetan authorities found the
9th Jebtsun Damba in Tibet in order to attract Mongols. But no outside government, not even the Japanese paid a great
deal of attention to this matter, due to the insignificance of the issue at that time. In 1942, the Japanese promoted the
reincarnation of another high lama, the Noyon Khutuktu Danzanravjaa, in Outer Mongolia who was a very influential
reincarnate lama in southern Mongolia. Japan’s support in promoting his reincarnation is a very interesting research
subject, which requires a more in depth study as well. The Japanese put him at one of the largest Inner Mongolian
Temples on the border with Outer Mongolia (Ibid., p. 271). However, this reincarnate held far less spiritual leverage to
attract the Mongols of Outer Mongolia under his political influence. Only local Inner Mongols were happy to have a
new reincarnation of the high Khutuktu, because it brought a purely spiritual significance to them at the local level.
As the years progressed into the late 1930’s and early 1940’s, the Japanese implemented educational,
organizational/structural, and reincarnate reforms in Mongol Buddhism in order to further their political, economic,
and territorial interests in the region. They first sought to reform Mongol Buddhism through re-educating young
Mongol lamas both in Mongol territory and in Japan, then to structurally change the hierarchical structure of the
Mongol Buddhist church by establishing a new oversight office, and third attempted to influence the search and
political/religious positions of key reincarnates such as the Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu, the Dilowa Khutukhtu, and the
Noyon Khutukhtu. In the end, however, given the regional nature of Mongol Buddhism, a regional religion that
transcends political borders, the consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Mongolian People’s Party
in Outer Mongolia, and the chaos in China at the time, the Japanese policy of using Buddhism to further its interests
proved to be too diverse and unmanageable in consolidating political power in the region.
Conclusion
Buddhism in Mongolia played a very significant role in promoting nationalism amongst different ethnic groups of the
Mongols in the early 20th century as her dominant neighbors farther advanced into Mongol territories. In reaction to
Russian, Chinese and later Japanese strategic interests and territorial expansions, the Mongols developed nationalist
movements throughout Buryat, Eastern (Manchurian), Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. These nationalist
movements coincided with Japan’s advancement in Inner Asia and they, to a large extent, manipulated such
movements and even promoted them for their political and cultural policies towards the local Mongols in the 1920s
and 1930s.
We examined in particular Japan’s role in attempting to provoke Mongol nationalism in her favor, by promoting
Buddhism in the above mentioned Mongol territories. Buddhism was an integral part of Mongol nationalism and the
Japanese attempted to strategically use Buddhism for their political agenda in continental Northeast Asia. In the first
part of the paper, I provided a brief historical account of Mongolia’s external political context and the causes of
nationalist sentimentalism and movements amongst the Mongols. The second part of the paper examined how the
Japanese first approached the Buryat Mongols in the early 1920s and attempted to manipulate Buddhism in reviving
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nationalism. Through such provocative nationalist activities based on Buddhism among the Buryat Mongols, Japan
sought to expand its political influence in the region and at the same time hoped that such actions would stop the
Bolshevik expansion in the Far East.
The third part of paper investigated Japan’s policy towards supporting Buddhism and reforming monastic
institutions in Eastern (Manchurian) and Inner Mongolia in order to promote the newly established government of the
“Great Mongol State” under Japan’s guidance in the 1930s. Such political and cultural moves, Japan expected, would
offer the Mongols especially those in Outer Mongolia who experienced brutal religious oppression at that period, an
alternative to Communism.
This study shows that Japan’s attempts failed not only to win extensive support from the Mongols in different
regions, but also to ease the political pressures from both the Chinese and Russians (the Soviet Union). Nevertheless,
Japan aimed at spreading its political and cultural influence amongst the Mongol ethnic groups such as the Buryat,
Inner, Eastern and Outer Mongols. A very significant part of such objective was about promoting nationalism by
supporting the local religion-Buddhism among the Mongols so it could in return endorse Japan’s expansion policy and
encourage anti-socialist feelings amongst the Mongols.
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